The establishment of the PCAOB has profoundly changed the auditing profession. We propose a model to study how auditing standards a¤ect audit quality. Auditing standards provide remedy to the auditors' possible misalignment of interest with investors. However, auditing standards also restrict auditors' exercise of professional judgement, which in turn leads to compliance mentality and reduces auditors' incentive to become competent in the …rst place. We identify the conditions under which stricter auditing standards increase or decrease audit quality. Moreover, stricter auditing standards always increase audit fees, but can bene…t auditors at …rms' expense. The model also generates a number of testable empirical predictions.
Introduction
In the wake of accounting frauds and audit failure in the early 2000s, the Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (also known as the PCAOB) in 2003 to ensure that auditors of a public company follow a set of strict guidelines. The investigation into the accounting and audit failures revealed that auditors did not conduct proper audits in discharging their responsibilities and that the auditing profession's self-regulation failed to hold auditors to strict auditing standards. 1 In response, the PCAOB was given broad authority to ful…ll its mandate to "improve audit quality, reduce the risks of auditing failures in the U.S. public securities market, and promote public trust in both the …nancial reporting process and auditing profession."The PCAOB establishes auditing standards for auditors to follow in the preparation of audit reports, inspects auditors'compliance with standards, and uses its investigative and disciplinary authority to sanction non-compliance.
While the PCAOB's stricter auditing standards can increase the overall audit level, their e¤ects on audit quality are more controversial. Conceptually, many have observed that the PCAOB's non-expert model in standards setting and inspection makes it more likely that its auditing standards are distant from auditing practice reality and con ‡ict with auditors'exercise of professional judgement. 2 Empirical evidence supporting such a view is also emerging.
For example, Doogar, Sivadasan, and Solomon (2010) shows that the PCAOB's …rst substantive auditing standard (AS 2) was too stringent (relative to its replacement AS 5). AS 2 required that auditors conduct an unprecedented degree of detailed testing, much of which was deemed as unnecessary by practicing auditors. Eventually, PCAOB admitted that "speci…c requirements directing the auditor (to test ICFR) are unnecessary and could contribute 1 The Panel on Audit E¤ectiveness, in the aftermath of the ever increasingly frequent restatements in late 1990's (e.g., GAO (2002a) ), expressed grave concerns that "auditors may not be requiring enough evidence, that is, they have reduced the scope of their audits and level of testing, to achieve reasonable assurance" (PAE (2000) ). The panel's report recommended that auditing standards be tightened to e¤ect a substantial increase in auditors' performance. After the revelation of audit failure in Enron, the government conducted its own investigation to the auditing practice and concluded that a government agency was the only way to …x the lax auditing standards (e.g., GAO (2002b) ).
2 For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which created the PCAOB, stipulates that no more than two Board members (out of …ve) can be CPAs and that the chairperson cannot be an active CPA. Moreover, the lack of auditing experience and expertise also extends to major sta¤ positions and inspectors. This non-expert model is widely discussed in Kinney Jr (2005) , Palmrose (2006) , Glover, Prawitt, and Taylor (2009) , Cox (2007) , Knechel (2013) and DeFond and Zhang (2014) .
to a checklist approach to compliance" and removed many such requirements in AS 5 to "allow auditors to apply more professional judgement as they work through the top-down approach" (PCAOB (2007) ). After reviewing the literature, DeFond and Zhang (2014) encourage "more research on the consequences of standard setting by examining how auditing standards might change the auditor's incentives and/or competency, and ultimately audit quality." We respond to this call.
We develop a formal model to study the e¤ects of auditing standards on audit quality.
We hope to shed light on some aspects of the following questions. Do stricter auditing standards improve audit quality? How do auditing standards a¤ect auditors' audit choices and competency? How do auditing standards a¤ect audit fees? What determine the auditors and …rms'preferences for auditing standards?
In the model, the auditor chooses audit level to balance the audit cost with her legal liabilities associated with audit failure. The auditor's interests may be misaligned with investors due to the inherent imperfection in the legal liability system. The misalignment of interest leads the auditor to perform subpar audits. This creates a demand for auditing standards in the form of a minimum auditing requirement. Built on this basic audit model, we introduce auditors'professional judgement. Auditors'professional judgement is modeled as their ability to assess the audit risk and allocate the audit resources accordingly. Auditors rely on their knowledge, experience and training to understand the particular circumstances of an engagement and then choose audit procedures accordingly to strike the balance between the audit failure risk and the audit cost.
We solve for the auditor's equilibrium choices of audit level and expertise development.
The auditor's equilibrium audit choice depends, in an intuitive manner, on her interest alignment with the …rm, her assessment of audit risk, and the auditing standards. Moreover, the auditor acquires more expertise when she anticipates that the expertise is more useful for her future audits. Finally, the audit fee is determined endogenously from the bargaining between the …rm and the auditor.
Having solved the equilibrium, we conduct comparative statics to provide insights about auditing standard's economic consequences. We …rst show that auditing standards a¤ect the auditor's audit choice and expertise development in three ways. First, auditing standards counteract the misaligned auditor's misconduct. The misaligned auditor would like to shirk on audit but is compelled to do more by stricter auditing standards. Second, auditing standards restrict the auditor's exercise of professional judgement and result in her compliance mentality. Since auditing standards cannot be tailored to every possible engagement circumstance, they could force the auditor to perform audits that are not cost-bene…t e¤ective judged from her professional perspective. Under those circumstances, the auditor has to suppress her professional judgement and comply with the standards. Finally, the auditor invests less in developing professional expertise as auditing standards become stricter. A requirement that the auditor has to perform a procedure renders irrelevant her ability to assess the procedure's cost-bene…t e¤ectiveness in the particular context of an engagement. Since it is costly to develop expertise, the auditor acquires less expertise in the …rst place when her professional judgement is more likely to be constrained by standards.
Built on these three elements of economic forces, we examine the e¤ects of auditing standards on audit quality. Audit quality in our model is de…ned as the inverse of the audit failure risk, the event when a …rm with an unquali…ed audit report later fails. We identify the conditions under which auditing standards increase or decrease audit quality. First, …xing the auditor's competence, stricter auditing standards always improve audit quality. Auditing standards restrict the auditor's exercise of professional judgement in a systematic manner.
Whenever the auditor's judgement disagrees with the standards, the auditor is forced to perform more audit work, which always reduces audit failure. Therefore, that auditing standards constrain the auditor's exercise of professional judgement, or the compliance mentality, is not su¢ cient for auditing standards to reduce audit quality. Second, one necessary condition under which auditing standards reduce audit quality is that the auditor's expertise development decision is su¢ ciently sensitive to auditing standards. When the auditor can adjust her expertise development decision, auditing standards a¤ect audit quality also through an indirect channel. Stricter auditing standards reduce the auditor's expertise acquisition and the lower auditor competence reduces the audit quality. In other words, auditing standards directly force auditors to do more work, but indirectly induce auditors to do the work in a less competent way. Overall, stricter auditing standards lead to lower audit quality when the indirect channel dominates the direct channel, which occurs when the auditor's expertise acquisition decision is su¢ ciently sensitive to auditing standards.
We have also examined auditing standards'e¤ects on audit fees and the expected payo¤s to the auditor and to the …rm. We show that stricter auditing standards always increase audit fees and increase audit fees more when the auditor's ability to adjust expertise is larger.
Moreover, the equilibrium payo¤s to the auditor and to the …rm have an inverse U-shaped relation with auditing standards. Moderate auditing standards bene…t both the auditor and the …rm, but too high standards could hurt both. In particular, there are conditions under which tighter auditing standards increase the auditor's expected payo¤s but reduce the …rm's expected payo¤s at the same time.
We have also provided one extension to accommodate imperfect enforcement of auditing standards. We show that improving enforcement for given standards has the similar e¤ects of tightening the standards. Thus, our model also provides insights about the economic consequences of enforcement and inspection (e.g., DeFond (2010), Gipper, Leuz, and Ma¤ett (2015) , and DeFond and Lennox (2017)).
Our model generates empirical predictions about the e¤ects of auditing standards on audit quality, audit fees, and audit expertise development. In particular, the model highlights that the auditor's ability to adjust her expertise acquisition could qualitatively a¤ect auditing standards' economic consequences. To the extent that auditors can adjust their expertise more easily in the long run than in the short run, tighter auditing standards always increase audit quality in the short run but can reduce audit quality in the long run. As a result, empirical tests face a critical research design choice regarding the timing. Even though examining the consequences of new standards in a timely manner improves the measurement and increases the policy relevance, the short-run consequences systematically favor tighter standards. Moreover, the model has policy implications as well. For example, even if the PCAOB cares more about audit quality than audit cost, setting too high standards could back …re. For another example, our model also predicts that standard setters with shorter horizons are inclined to set higher accounting standards.
Several authors, including Sunder (1997) and Dye, Glover, and Sunder (2014) , have noted that tighter auditing standards can interfere with auditors'acquisition and exercise of professional judgement. However, the sources and consequences of such interaction are seldom explicated. To our best knowledge, our paper is the …rst model to formalize the interaction between auditors'professional judgement and auditing standards. Most prior studies on auditing standards have focused almost exclusively on their interaction with auditors'legal liabilities. In his seminal paper, Dye (1993) studies the e¤ects of auditing standards on audit quality. Among other results, he shows that tighter auditing standards could reduce audit quality. In his model, the auditor can either comply with the auditing standards that perfectly shields her from liabilities or conduct subpar audit that exposes her to liabilities. When the bar (auditing standards) is set too high, the auditor …nds it too costly to comply and thus chooses to lower the level of audit. Ye and Simunic (2013) study the optimal design of both the tightness and vagueness of auditing standards. They show that the optimal standard should have no vagueness if the tightness of the standard can be set optimally. However, vague standards can be optimal if the tightness of the standards cannot be optimally set. We complement this literature by introducing auditors' professional judgment and studying its interaction with auditing standards.
We also contribute to the theoretical literature on audit quality and audit fees, two commonly used proxies for audit outcomes. This literature has analyzed various determinants of audit quality and audit fees. 3 We provide a di¤erent angle from the interaction of auditing standards with the auditors'exercise and development of professional expertise. We formalize the consequences of the check-list approaches induced by auditing standards. We show that tighter standards could reduce audit quality because requiring auditors to do more work induces auditors to do the work in a less e¢ cient manner.
More broadly, the law and economics literatures have studied both ex ante regulation and ex post legal liabilities as two modes of regulating behaviors (e.g., Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson (1990), Shavell (2013) ). The prior auditing literature has focused more on the ex post legal liabilities. 4 Since the establishment of PCAOB, auditing standards that regulate auditors' ex ante behavior have been exerting more in ‡uence on auditors' behavior. Thus, understanding the economic consequences of auditing standards become more important.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 solves the equilibrium decisions. Section 4 examines the economic consequences of auditing standards. Section 5 provides two extensions to the main model. Section 6 discusses empirical implications of the model, and Section 7 concludes.
The model
We augment a standard audit model with the auditors'exercise and acquisition of professional expertise. The standard component follows Dye (1995) and Laux and Newman (2010) . The model consists of two players, one auditor and one …rm representing its investors. The …rm hires the auditor to perform an audit and then makes an investment decision. 5 The …rm's project requires an initial investment I: The project ultimately either succeeds (a good project) or fails (a bad project), denoted as ! 2 fG; Bg: The success generates cash ‡ow G > I while the failure generates cash ‡ow B; which is normalized to be 0: The prior probability that the investment will be a failure is p: We assume W 0 (1 p) G I > 0, which implies that the …rm's default decision is to invest in absence of additional information. 6 The …rm doesn't have private information about ! and always sends the auditor a favorable report for attestation. 7 4 e.g., Antle and Nalebu¤ (1991) , Dye (1995) , Schwartz (1997) , Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic (2008) , Newman, Patterson, and Smith (2005) , Lu and Sapra (2009), Laux and Newman (2010) , Deng, Melumad, and Shibano (2012) . 5 We assume that the …rm makes the investment on behalf of investors. Alternatively, we could distinguish between current and new investors. The current investors sell the …rm in a competitive market to new investors who in turn make the investment decision. Such a setting introduces additional notations without a¤ecting the main results.
6 Alternatively, if W0 < 0; the …rm's default decision is not to invest. The value of audit report is then to identify the good projects, rather than to cull out the bad ones. Such an alternative assumption doesn't qualitatively a¤ect the results. What is important for our results is that audit reports are relevant for the investment decisions and thus there is demand for audit.
7 This assumption simpli…es the …rm's reporting issue and focuses the model on the auditing issue. It is commonly made in the auditing literature (e.g., Dye (1993) , Dye (1995) , Lu and Sapra (2009) , Laux and Newman (2010) , Ye and Simunic (2013) ). For the interaction between …nancial reporting and auditing, see Newman, Patterson, and Smith (2001) , Patterson and Smith (2003) , Mittendorf (2010) , Deng, Melumad, and Shibano (2012) , and Kronenberger and Laux (2016) .
The …rm hires an auditor for a negotiated fee, denoted as . The fee negotiation is conducted as a Nash Bargaining process. The auditor has bargaining power t 2 (0; 1) and the …rm 1 t: The bargaining power is determined by the competition in the market for audit services. The auditor has more bargaining power (a larger t) when the audit market is less competitive. 8 In return for the fee, the auditor issues an audit report r and bears possible legal liability for audit failure. The auditor performs an audit in order to issue an audit report. Denote the audit report as r 2 fg; bg: r = g is an unquali…ed opinion that the …rm's favorable report is prepared appropriately, while r = b is a quali…ed opinion that disapproves the …rm's initial favorable report. Denote a 2 [0; 1] as the audit level the auditor chooses. The audit technology is as follows:
The essence of this audit technology is that more audit reduces audit failure, which is de…ned as the event whereby the …rm fails after the auditor issued an unquali…ed opinion, i.e., the event (! = B; r = g): 9 The audit failure risk is p (1 a) and it is decreasing in audit level a. 10 Parameter captures the audit risk and we will return to it later. The cost of audit a is C(a): C(a) has the standard properties:
C 00 > 0, C 000 0; and C 0 (1) being su¢ ciently large. One example of such a cost function is
2 a 2 with a su¢ ciently large c. In addition to issuing an audit report, the auditor is also subject to legal liabilities. A 8 We use an open interval for t to avoid discussions of corner solutions. Empirically, t is likely to be interior, that is, the auditor has some but not all the bargaining power with its clients. 9 This audit technology is commonly adopted in the literature, e.g., Dye (1993) , Dye (1995) , Schwartz (1997) , Bockus and Gigler (1998) , Chan and Pae (1998) , Hillegeist (1999) , Radhakrishnan (1999) , Chan and Wong (2002) , Mittendorf (2010) , and Laux and Newman (2010) , among others. The technology assumes away the possibility that the audit could create concerns of false positives whereby the good state is mistaken as bad. The possibility of these errors can place an additional burden of proof on auditors but won't a¤ect our results qualitatively as long as the audit is overall still valuable to the …rm. 1 0 One interpretation of audit a could be sample size. Auditors employ sampling techniques and inherent sampling error routinely arise in auditing. Auditors face some risk that misstatements will not be uncovered in test work; however, such risk is mitigated as the sample size increases. perfect legal liability system would require that the auditor reimburse the …rm the investment cost I in the event of audit failure. Under such a perfect system the auditor would fully internalize the consequences of audit failure and there would be no demand for auditing standards. To create such demand, we assume that the legal liability system is not perfect.
In particular, in the event of audit failure, the auditor pays damage I with 2 f0; 1g and Pr( = 1) = s: The auditor pays the full damage only with probability s 2 (0; 1). With the complementary probability 1 s; the auditor gets away and pays no damage. 11 s measures the incentive alignment between the auditor and the …rm. For simplicity, we refer to as the auditor's type and call the auditor with aligned incentives ( = 1) as the aligned auditor and the one with misaligned incentives ( = 0) as the misaligned auditor. We assume that the auditor observes after she accepts the engagement but before she chooses audit level a: We discuss in Section 5.2 an alternative timing when is observed by both parties before negotiating the audit fee .
An auditing standard Q 2 (0; 1) requires that the auditor choose at least audit level a Q:
To focus on the e¤ects of standards, we assume away the enforcement issue in the main model. Instead, we assume that the auditor obeys any given standard Q (and otherwise receives a su¢ ciently large penalty from the regulator). Since Q is a minimum audit requirement, its satisfaction does not shield the auditor from the legal liabilities. 12 We extend the model to incorporate imperfect enforcement and inspection in Section 5.1. So far our model is a fairly standard one (e.g., Dye (1995) , Laux and Newman (2010) ). Now we augment it with auditors' professional expertise. An e¤ective audit balances the bene…t of reducing audit failure risk with the increased audit cost. In planning and conducting the audit, auditors use not only hard and quanti…able information but also subjective and soft information about the speci…c engagement to allocate the audit e¤orts to the areas with greater risk of audit failure. We interpret the use of soft and subjective information in assessing the audit risk as the exercise of professional judgement. By this de…nition, 1 1 In practice, the legal system is not perfect in disciplining the auditor (i.e., s could be smaller than 1) for at least three reasons. First, some audit failures don't lead to litigations against auditors. Second, auditors don't always lose the litigations. Finally, even if an auditor loses a litigation, she is protected by limited liability and may not pay the entire damage su¤ered by investors. 1 2 Dye (1995) provides multiple justi…cations for this assumption (see page 81).
professional judgment cannot be completely replaced by auditing standards. This assumption is similar to that made in the incomplete contracting literature that some information can be used in decision-making but cannot be contracted on (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1986) ).
Auditors obtain such subjective information from their training, knowledge, and experience.
Thus, they could make costly investment to improve their professional expertise.
We operationalize professional judgement as follows. First, we assume that the audit risk parameter~ in equation 1 that is, the expert auditor's posterior belief about audit risk m i is more precise than m u : For example, if the expert's judgement is perfect while the non-expert has no clue at all, then m i =~ ; m u = 0 and m i is a mean-preserving spread of m u . Third, auditing standard Q is independent of and/or m : Finally, it is costly for the auditor to develop expertise. Before accepting the audit contract, the auditor chooses expertise e at cost kK(e): kK(e) has the standard properties:
being su¢ ciently large. One example of such a cost function is kK(e) = k 2 e 2 with k being properly restricted. The auditor's expertise e is observable to the …rm at the time of contract negotiation.
The timeline is summarized as follows:
At date 0; the auditor chooses expertise e at cost kK(e): Observing the auditor's expertise e; the …rm hires the auditor and negotiates the audit fee :
At date 1; the auditor discovers engagement details m and her incentive alignment , chooses audit level a at cost C(a); and issues audit report r:
At date 2; the …rm invests only upon receiving an unquali…ed report. 14 If the investment is made, the payo¤s are realized. If the audit failure occurs, the auditor pays damage I to the investors.
The equilibrium solution concept for the model is subgame perfection.
Finally, we describe the payo¤s to the auditor and to the …rm. The auditor's expected payo¤ at date 0 is
In addition to the audit fee and the cost of expertise acquisition kK(e); the auditor choose audit a with cost C(a ) and pays legal damage I in the event of audit failure, which occurs with probability pm (1 a ):
The …rm's expected payo¤ at date 0 is
The …rm's payo¤ in absence of audit is W 0 : The …rm pays audit fee and receives both an audit report and insurance from the auditor. If the audit report is r = b; which occurs with probability pE m ; [1 m (1 a )]; the …rm doesn't invest and saves the investment cost I: If the audit report is r = g; the …rm invests and receives a damage payment I from the auditor 1 4 To simplify the exposition, we omit the …rm's investment decision from the equilibrium description. It can be veri…ed that at date 2 it is indeed optimal for the …rm not to invest when r = b and to invest when r = g. When the audit report is r = b; the audit technology suggests that Pr(! = Gjr = b) = 0 and thus the …rm doesn't invest. On the other hand, r = g revises upward the belief about the project's fundamental. Under the assumption of W0 > 0; the …rm invests with the prior belief and thus will invest when the belief improves. In sum, it is optimal to invest if and only if an unquali…ed report is issued. 
The equilibrium
The model is solved by backward induction.
The auditor' s audit choice
At date 1; after observing her incentive alignment and assessing the engagement's audit risk m ; the auditor chooses audit level a (m ) to maximize her expected payo¤ U de…ned in equation 2 subject to the auditing standard Q. We have written a (m ) to highlight the fact that the auditor observes and m before choosing the audit level a: The audit choice problem is summarized below:
On one hand, audit bene…ts the auditor by reducing her possible legal liabilities arising from audit failure. With audit a; the auditor detects the bad state with probability p(1 m (1 a)) and avoids legal liabilities I: On the other hand, audit is expensive and costs the auditor C(a): The auditor chooses the optimal audit level to balance this trade-o¤. To highlight the impacts of the auditing standard constraint a Q; we start with the relaxed problem without the constraint. Denoting a (m ) as the auditor's optimal audit choice in absence of auditing standards, we solve the optimization problem and obtain
In absence of auditing standards, the auditor's audit choice depends on both her assessment of audit risk m and her incentive alignment . She conducts more audit when she judges that the engagement's audit risk is higher (e.g., a higher m ) and/or when she is more likely to be subject to legal liabilities in the event of audit failure (i.e., a higher ).
Now we introduce the regulatory constraint a Q: Given the simple structure, we can obtain the closed-form solution for the auditor's optimal audit choice:
In the presence of auditing standards, the auditor compares her optimal choice in absence of standards (a (m )) with the requirement (Q) and chooses the larger one.
The audit fee negotiation
At date 0; before the auditor observes the engagement details m and ; the auditor negotiates audit fee with the …rm through Nash bargaining in which they divide the expected audit value according to their respective bargaining power t and 1 t.
The expected audit value is derived as follows. At the stage of negotiating audit fees, both parties observe the auditor's expertise e but anticipate the auditor's equilibrium audit choice a (m ) in equation 6. From the perspective of the joint payo¤s to the auditor and the …rm, audit a detects the bad project with probability p [1 m (1 a)] but costs C(a).
Thus, the equilibrium audit value, conditional on the equilibrium audit choice a (m ); is thus
We write the equilibrium audit value as a function of auditor type and information m because a (m ) is ultimately a function of and m : Since the two parties haven't observed and m at date 0; they negotiate to divide the expected equilibrium audit value
The auditor and the …rm compare their equilibrium expected payo¤s from a successful negotiation with those o¤ equilibrium (if they were to walk away from the negotiation) in order to determine their surplus from the cooperation. Their expected payo¤s in the various scenarios are summarized in Table 1 . 
Negotiation succeeds U W
The auditor's expected payo¤ from walking away the negotiation is kK(e): The auditor doesn't perform any audit and is not subject to any legal liability. However, at the time of the negotiation, the auditor has already acquired expertise e at the cost of kK(e) and still bears this sunk cost if she were to walk away from the negotiation. Similarly, in absence of an audit the …rm always makes the investment and the …rm's payo¤ is W 0 . This explains the …rst row in Table 1 :
The equilibrium payo¤s to the auditor and the …rm are U and W in equation 2 and 3 evaluated at the equilibrium audit choice a (m ): The audit fee is set as such that the auditor's net surplus from the engagement is equal to t portion of the expected audit value
. 15 In other words, is determined by
Writing out the expectation and rearranging the terms, we can express the audit fee as a function of audit expertise e in the following way:
The three components of audit fee are intuitive. They are the reimbursement for the expected audit cost, the reimbursement for the legal liabilities cost, and the t fraction of the audit surplus. Moreover, the cost of expertise development, kK(e), is not directly reimbursed through the audit fee. This re ‡ects the hold-up problem between the auditor and the …rm.
At the time of audit fee negotiation, the auditor's expertise development cost is sunk and thus irrelevant for the negotiation. This a¤ects the auditor's incentive to develop expertise in the …rst place, to which we turn now.
The auditor' s expertise acquisition decision
Before the audit fee negotiation, the auditor chooses expertise e to maximize her expected payo¤ U de…ned in equation 2. Equation 8 from the previous subsection suggests that U can be rewritten as
The auditor enjoys t fraction of the expected equilibrium audit value E m ; [ (m )]
but bears the entire cost of expertise acquisition kK(e): The expected equilibrium audit value E m ; [ (m )] is decomposed into three components in the second line. The …rst and second components are the expected audit value contributed by a misaligned auditor and an aligned non-expert auditor, respectively. The last component is the incremental audit value contributed by an aligned expert auditor (relative to an aligned non-expert auditor). The auditor chooses e to maximize U (e) and the …rst-order condition is
The right hand side is the marginal cost of expertise. As the cost parameter k increases, the auditor acquires less expertise in equilibrium. The left hand side is the marginal bene…t of expertise, which is a¤ected by three factors. First, the aligned auditor performs the audit in a more e¤ective way when she is an expert than when she is not. This bene…t is captured by the incremental audit value
; which is proved to be positive in the Appendix. The expert auditor who understands the audit risk better can allocate the audit resources more e¢ ciently to the area of greater audit risk. Even though the proof of this claim is technically involved, the intuition is clear. At the stage of performing the audit, the audit fee is sunk and the aligned auditor's audit choice is an e¤ectively single-person decision. Expertise allows the aligned expert auditor to increase the dispersion of her audit choices ex post and thus her audit choice becomes more e¢ cient.
The second determinant of the auditor's expertise acquisition is the auditor's bargaining power t: As we have discussed toward the end of the previous subsection, the auditor's expertise development is subject to a hold-up problem in that the audit fee doesn't directly reimburse the auditor for her expertise development cost. However, the auditor does indirectly bene…t from her own expertise because it increases the size of expected audit value E m ; [ (m )]; of which she is able to secure t fraction in the bargaining process. Thus, the auditor's bargaining power in fee negotiation helps mitigates the hold-up problem and encourages the auditor to develop more expertise.
Finally, the auditor acquires more expertise if she expects that the legal liability system is more likely to hold her responsible in the future (i.e., a higher s). When the auditor's incentive is not aligned with investors, i:e:; = 0; she works only to ful…ll the minimum requirement and thus doesn't utilize her professional judgement. As a result, the misaligned
is not a¤ected by her expertise, either. In other words, the weaker ex post discipline from the legal liability system (a lower s) also reduces the auditor's ex ante incentive to develop professional expertise.
We have solved all the equilibrium decisions. The equilibrium is summarized below.
Proposition 1
The unique sub-game perfect equilibrium is as follows:
1. the auditor with incentive and risk assessment m chooses audit level a (m ) according to equation 6; 2. the equilibrium audit fee is determined by equation 9 evaluated at e = e ; 3. the auditor develops expertise e according to equation 10.
The economic consequences of auditing standards
To highlight the model's insights and empirical predictions, we now conduct comparative statics in three steps. First, we examine how auditing standards a¤ect the equilibrium decisions described in Proposition 1. Second, we use the e¤ects of auditing standards on the equilibrium decisions as building blocks to study our central question about how auditing standards a¤ect the equilibrium audit quality. Finally, we also study the e¤ects of auditing standards on audit fees and on the equilibrium payo¤s to the auditor and the …rm.
The auditing standards'e¤ects on audit level and auditor competence
Proposition 2 De…ningm C 0 (Q) pI : As auditing standard Q increases, 1. the equilibrium audit level by both the aligned and misaligned auditors are higher, i:e:;
2. the equilibrium audit expertise e is lower, i:e:;
Proposition 2 is intuitive. First, higher auditing standards lead the auditor to work more.
To see this, we can check who …nd the auditing standards binding. Equation 6 an expert auditor creates (relative to an non-expert auditor),
First, auditing standard Q reduces the expected equilibrium audit value created by both the expert and non-expert auditors. As we have discussed above, the aligned auditor …nds the minimum requirement Q binds if her ex post risk assessment is low (i:e:; m <m): Whenever the aligned auditor …nds the auditing standard constraint binding, the audit level she ends up performing is higher than that justi…ed by her professional judgement. Therefore, ex ante (before observing m ) a tighter standard always reduces the aligned auditor's expected equilibrium audit value. In other words, the compliance mentality induced by auditing standards lowers the audit value created by both the expert and non-expert auditors. Second, auditing standard Q reduce the audit value created by the expert auditor more than that by the non-expert auditor. This is the key intuition why auditing standards Q reduce the auditor's incentives to become an expert. The technical proof of this result is complicated, but the intuition is relatively straightforward. When auditing standards constrain the auditor's exercise of expertise, the constraint is more consequential for an expert than for a non-expert.
When the auditor has to perform a set of audit procedures regardless of her assessment of the audit risk, her expertise in assessing the audit risk becomes irrelevant and thus her incentive to acquire such expertise diminishes. As a result, auditing standards lead to less competent auditors. This inherent con ‡ict between auditing standards and professional expertise is a key force to understand the auditing standards'economic consequences.
That the auditor's expertise acquisition is sensitive to auditing standards plays an important role in the subsequent results. We further study the determinants of the sensitivity of the auditor's equilibrium expertise to auditing standards.
Lemma 1
The speed at which the equilibrium expertise e decreases in auditing standard Q is increasing in s and t but decreasing in k: That is,
The intuition for the lemma is as follows. By diminishing the value of expertise to the auditor, auditing standards reduces her expertise acquisition. This adverse e¤ect is stronger when the value of expertise to the auditor is larger, which occurs when the auditor has more bargaining power, better incentive alignment, or lower cost of expertise acquisition.
Having understood how auditing standards a¤ect the auditor's equilibrium choices, we are now ready to study the e¤ects of auditing standards on audit quality. Before proceeding, note that since we work with the general cost functions for audit and expertise acquisition and the general distribution of audit risk ; the second-order e¤ects of auditing standard Q on the equilibrium variables are often complex. Thus, we assume that the relevant secondorder conditions with the general structure are satis…ed so that we could focus on the unique thresholds. We verify that they are indeed satis…ed in a quadratic-cost-uniform-distribution speci…cation elaborated in the Appendix.
The auditing standards'e¤ects on audit quality
The (equilibrium) audit quality is de…ned as the complement to the ex ante audit failure risk:
Audit quality A depends on not only the audit level a (m ) per se but also the match between the audit level choice and the audit risk~ :
Intuitively, if auditing standards were set to the extreme by mandating the maximum possible audit regardless of the engagement circumstances, then the audit quality would be the highest possible. However, such extreme auditing standards would be prohibitively costly. De…ne Q C 0 1 (p 0 I); the auditing standard an aligned auditor without professional judgement will …nd binding. An audit standard tighter than Q is extreme because it always hurts the interests of both the auditor and the …rm (regardless of the auditor's incentive alignment), as we will show in later subsections.
We now turn to the more interesting case with non-extreme standards Q Q.
Proposition 3
If s or t are su¢ ciently large or if k is su¢ ciently small, there exists a threshold Q A < Q; such that audit quality A is increasing in Q if Q Q A and decreasing in
Proposition 3 gives the conditions under which auditing standards lead to lower audit quality. This result might be surprising, in particular in light of Proposition 2 that auditing standards increase ex post audit levels by both types of auditors. By mandating a higher level of minimum audit and forcing all auditors to work more, tighter auditing standards could paradoxically reduce audit quality.
To understand the intuition, we di¤erentiate A with respect to Q and obtain
Auditing standard Q a¤ects audit quality through two channels. The …rst is a direct channel @A @Q ; which is always positive. Keeping the audit expertise e constant, a tighter auditing standard always improves audit quality, as we show formally in the following corollary. The positive direct e¤ect is due to the following reasons. First, the higher audit level by the misaligned auditor improves audit quality. Second, the higher audit level by the aligned auditor also improves audit quality when the auditor's expertise is …xed. This is because auditing standard Q restricts the aligned auditor's exercise of professional judgment in a systematic manner. Whenever the aligned auditor …nds the auditing standard binding, she performs more audit than that justi…ed by her professional judgement. The excessive audit improves the probability of uncovering errors and thus improves audit quality. Overall, the audit quality increases in auditing standard Q when the audit expertise is …xed. Therefore, auditing standards' constraint of auditors' exercise of professional judgement, or the compliance mentality, is not su¢ cient for auditing standards to reduce audit quality.
However, auditing standards have an indirect e¤ect on auditing quality through their e¤ects on auditors'expertise acquisition decision. As we have seen in Proposition 2, auditing standards reduce the auditor's expertise acquisition, that is, de dQ < 0: Moreover, the lower audit expertise leads to lower audit quality @A @e > 0. Audit expertise enables the aligned auditor to tailor audit resources to areas of greater audit risk and thus reduce audit risk more e¢ ciently. Combining de dQ < 0 and @A @e > 0; we have shown that auditing standards indirectly reduce audit quality by lowering the auditor's competence.
Therefore, there is a trade-o¤ between the direct e¤ect of forcing auditors to do more work and the indirect e¤ect of inducing auditors to be less competent. The indirect e¤ect is stronger when the auditor's expertise acquisition decision is more sensitive to auditing standards. It dominates the direct e¤ect, and as a result tighter auditing standards reduce audit quality, when the auditors' expertise acquisition decision is su¢ ciently sensitive to auditing standards. The sensitivity is increasing in the auditor's incentive alignment s and bargaining power t but decreasing in the auditor's cost of expertise acquisition k; as we have seen in Lemma 1. This explains the conditions in Proposition 3.
The auditing standards'e¤ects on audit fee
We now examine the e¤ects of auditing standards on audit fee (e ), as given in equation
9.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium audit fee is increasing in auditing standard Q, i:e:
Stricter auditing standards always lead to higher audit fees. To understand the intuition, we also di¤erentiate with respect to Q and obtain
The direct e¤ect of auditing standards on audit fee is positive. To see this, we rewrite the audit fee in equation 9 as follows (the derivation can be found in the proof of Proposition 4):
+s X 2fi;ug
The …rst component is the audit fee for the misaligned auditor. When she has no bargaining power, which occurs with probability (1 t) ; she receives only the reimbursement of audit cost C(Q). When she has all the bargaining power, she receives both the cost reimbursement and the audit value, which amounts to the gross audit value p (1 0 (1 Q)) I.
Since both terms are increasing in Q; the audit fee to the misaligned auditor is increasing in Q: Higher auditing standards compel the misaligned auditor to perform more audit, which increases both the audit cost and the gross audit value.
The second component of audit fee is for the aligned auditor. Since we focus on the direct e¤ect here, Pr( ); which is a function of expertise e ; is …xed. Thus, we only need to understand how Q a¤ects pI (1 t) E m [ 1 (m )]: It is more instructive to understand this component from the …rm's perspective. Even though the …rm doesn't observe the auditor's type, it reasons as follows. If it is dealing with the aligned auditor, which occurs with probability s; the …rm receives the damage of I in the event of audit failure. Compared with the no auditing case, the …rm saves the investment cost in the bad project, pI: The …rm subtracts its share of surplus, (1 t) E m [ 1 (m )]; from the total saving of pI and remits the rest to the auditor through the audit fee. Since auditing standard Q always reduces the aligned auditor's expected audit value E m [ 1 (m )]; this second component in equation 12
is also increasing in Q.
The indirect e¤ect of auditing standards on audit fee through their e¤ect on expertise acquisition is positive as well. We have known from Proposition 2 that stricter auditing standards reduce expertise acquisition, i:e:; de dQ < 0: We now explain why the equilibrium audit fee is decreasing in audit expertise, that is, @ @e < 0: @ @e captures the fee di¤erences paid to an expert relative to a non-expert aligned auditor. 16 From the discussion in the previous paragraph about the second component of audit fee in equation 12, the audit fee for the aligned auditor is decreasing in the expected audit value. Because the non-expert auditor creates a smaller expected audit value, the fee paid to an expert auditor is thus lower than to her non-expert counterpart. A stricter auditing standard reduces auditor expertise and the lower audit expertise in turn leads to higher audit fee. Therefore, the indirect e¤ect is also positive and stricter auditing standards unambiguously lead to higher audit fees.
Since the indirect e¤ect further increases audit fee, the audit fee increases faster when the indirect e¤ect is stronger. The indirect e¤ect is stronger when the auditor's expertise acquisition is more sensitive to auditing standards. Thus, we have the following result.
Corollary 2 Auditing standards increase audit fee faster when the auditor's expertise acquisition is more sensitive to auditing standards.
The auditing standards'e¤ects on payo¤s
Audit quality and audit fees are two important audit outcomes that are empirically widely researched. However, neither is comprehensive in measuring the e¤ects of auditing standards on the auditor and the …rm, to which we turn now. The equilibrium expected payo¤s to the auditor and to the …rm, de…ned in equation 2 and 3 and evaluated at the equilibrium, can be rewritten as
Recall that E m ; [ (m )] is the expected equilibrium audit value (gross of expertise acquisition cost). It is divided between the auditor and the …rm according to their respective 1 6 This can be derived explicitly as follows:
bargaining power t and 1 t: In addition, the auditor pays the expertise acquisition cost kK(e ) and the …rm has the outside option value of W 0 (without using audit).
Proposition 5
1. There exists a threshold Q U such that the auditor's equilibrium payo¤ U is increasing in Q if Q Q U and decreasing in Q if Q > Q U ;
2. There exists a threshold Q W such that the …rm value W is increasing in Q if Q Q W and decreasing in Q if Q > Q W ;
3. Q W < Q U < Q:
Proposition 5 states that the equilibrium payo¤s to both the auditor and the …rm have an inverse U-shaped relation with auditing standards. Moreover, Part 3 suggests that when the initial standard Q belongs to (Q W ; Q U ); tightening the standard hurts the …rm value but increases the auditors'expected payo¤ at the same time. Finally, extreme auditing standards that exceed Q reduce the payo¤s to both the auditor and the …rm, as we have claimed in Subsection 4.2.
To better understand the intuition for these results, we again decompose the e¤ects of auditing standards to the direct and indirect e¤ects. The direct e¤ect can be isolated when we …x the auditor's expertise, as summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3 For any given audit expertise e;
1. There exists a thresholdQ U such that the auditor's equilibrium payo¤ U is increasing
2. There exists a thresholdQ W such that the …rm value W is increasing in Q if Q Q W and decreasing in Q if Q >Q W :
Corollary 3 shows that auditing standards have two opposing e¤ects on the auditor and the …rm's payo¤s even in absence of auditors'adjustment of expertise acquisition. On one hand, the auditing standard moves the misaligned auditor's choice toward the e¢ cient level and improves the equilibrium payo¤s to both parties. On the other hand, the auditing standard constrains the aligned auditor from fully exercising her professional judgement and compels her to perform excessive procedures that are not justi…ed by her professional judgement. The excessive audit reduces the equilibrium audit value due to the excessive cost. The value loss from constraining the aligned auditor can dominate the bene…t of disciplining the misaligned auditor, resulting in net loss of audit value and lower equilibrium payo¤s to both parties.
Moreover, when the audit expertise is …xed, the e¤ects of auditing standards on the auditor and on the …rm are the same, i:e:;Q W =Q U : In this case, auditing standards a¤ect only the equilibrium audit value E m ; [ (m )] (but doesn't a¤ect the expertise acquisition).
Since the audit value is divided proportionately between the auditor and the …rm, the e¤ects of the auditing standards on the audit value are also borne proportionately by the two parties.
In addition to the direct e¤ect, auditing standards also have an indirect e¤ect on audit value through the auditor's expertise acquisition. We have known from Proposition 2 that stricter auditing standards reduce expertise acquisition, i:e:; de dQ < 0: Now we explain how the …rm and the auditor's equilibrium payo¤s respond to audit expertise. Since the auditor chooses expertise e to maximize her equilibrium payo¤, optimality requires that the marginal e¤ect of expertise on the auditor's equilibrium payo¤ is 0; i:e:; dU de j e=e = 0: The …rm's perspective, however, is di¤erent. The …rm shares 1 t fraction of the audit value, but doesn't bear any of the expertise development cost. As a result of this hold-up problem, the …rm prefers a higher level of audit expertise than the auditor. At the point e = e where the marginal bene…t and marginal costs of expertise are equal for the auditor, the …rm still …nds that the marginal bene…t is larger than the marginal cost and that the equilibrium payo¤ is still increasing in expertise. Therefore, a stricter standard reduces the auditor's expertise acquisition, and the lower expertise doesn't a¤ect the auditor's payo¤ but does reduce the …rm value on margin. In other words, the indirect e¤ect of auditing standards is absent for the auditor's equilibrium payo¤ but is negative for the …rm value. Taking into account both the direct and indirect e¤ects, there exist thresholds above which stricter standards could hurt the auditor and/or the …rm.
Part 3 of Proposition 5 becomes intuitive as well. In absence of the indirect e¤ect, the auditor and the …rm have the same preferences for auditing standards. The indirect e¤ect doesn't a¤ect the auditor's preference because the auditor could adjust the acquisition expertise optimally, but it reduces the …rm value. Therefore, the presence of the indirect channel leads to the result that the …rm is more likely to be hurt by stricter auditing standards than the auditor. When the initial standard Q belongs to (Q W ; Q U ); an increase in the standard is detrimental to the …rm value but bene…cial to the auditor.
Finally, one could also add up the payo¤s to the audit and to the …rm and calculate the joint payo¤ as V = W + U : Since we have explained how auditing standards a¤ect both components W and U ; it is straightforward to understand how auditing standards a¤ect the joint payo¤.
Corollary 4 There exists a threshold Q V such that the joint payo¤ V is increasing in Q if
Extensions

Imperfect enforcement and inspection
The PCAOB a¤ects auditing standards not only through its standard setting activities but also through its enforcement and inspection activities. In the baseline model we have isolated the e¤ects of auditing standards from their enforcement and inspection by assuming perfect enforcement. In practice, enforcement and inspection also a¤ect the economic consequences of auditing standards. While it is beyond this paper's scope to fully examine the interaction between auditing standards and their enforcement, we provide a simple extension to show that improving enforcement and inspection could be viewed as one way to increase auditing standards. 17 Thus, our results on the economic consequences of tightening auditing standards can also be extrapolated to understand the economic consequences of improving enforcement and inspections.
We relax the assumption that auditing standards are always followed by the auditor.
Instead, we explicitly introduce the auditor's decision on whether to abide by the standard.
At t = 1 the auditor can choose any audit level a 0: After the auditor has chosen a, the regulator (e.g., the PCAOB) inspects the auditor's work and …nds out whether a Q with a probability f: f is thus the enforcement/inspection strength. If the auditor is found to have chosen a < Q; she receives a penalty. The penalty is heterogeneous across auditors because it is related to detailed characteristics of auditors and engagements. We denote the penalty asx and for simplicity assume thatx follows a uniform distribution in the interval [0; x] with x > 0. All other aspects of the model are the same in the main model. The auditor learns about x at the time of choosing audit level but after the fee negotiation.
We verify that, for a given standard Q, enforcement strength f a¤ects the auditor's equilibrium choices in the same way as auditing standards do. Increasing the inspection probability f increases the expected penalties for violating auditing standards and strengthens auditors' compliance incentives. This in turn forces auditors to increase their audit levels, restricts the aligned auditors'exercise of professional judgement and reduces their incentive to acquire expertise in the …rst place. These results are summarized below. 2. the equilibrium audit expertise e is lower, i:e:; de df < 0:
Corollary 5 De…ningm
Corollary 5 resembles Proposition 2. It con…rms that increasing enforcement f has the same e¤ects on auditors'behavior as tightening auditing standards. Since these basic elements of economic forces drive our results about the auditing standards'economic consequences in the main model, improving enforcement or increasing inspection probability would have the similar e¤ects on audit quality and audit fees as well.
Di¤erent timing of observing legal liability exposure
In our main model, we have assumed that the auditor observes her type after the fee negotiation. Now we study an alternative timing assumption that is observed before the fee negotiation by both the auditor and the …rm. All other aspects of the model are the same as the main model.
Corollary 6
When the auditor's type is observed before fee negotiation by both the auditor and the …rm, the equilibrium audit and expertise levels fa ; e g are the same as in our main model. Audit fee is a function of ; : Moreover,
Corollary 6 shows that both the equilibrium audit level and expertise acquisition remain the same as in our main model. The audit fees are now contingent on ; but the expected audit fees remain the same as in the main model (i:e:; = E [ ]). The equilibrium audit choice a is independent of the audit fee because at the time of making audit choice the audit fee is already sunk. As a result, the equilibrium audit value is the same as in the main model.
Moreover, the expertise decision is made at date t = 0 and thus depends on the expected equilibrium audit value and audit fees averaged over . Since both the expected audit fees and the expected equilibrium audit values are not a¤ected, the auditor's expertise acquisition decision is the same. Since this alternative timing leads to the same equilibrium choices of audit and expertise acquisition, all our main results in the main model are intact.
The empirical implications
The model generates a number of empirical implications. Most of our formal results provide empirical predictions about the auditing standards'e¤ects on audit quality, audit fees, and audit expertise acquisition. To save space, we highlight only a few results here.
First, stricter auditing standards can either increase or decrease audit quality. They are more likely to decrease audit quality when 1) the initial standards are already high; 2) when the auditors'incentives are better aligned with investors; 3) the auditors'bargaining power is high; and 4) when the auditors' cost of expertise development is lower. The latter three factors determine the strength of the indirect e¤ect, as explained in Lemma 1.
Second, the auditing standards'economic consequences di¤er in the short-run and in the long-run to the extent that auditors can adjust their expertise level more easily in the longrun than in the short-run. For example, stricter auditing standards always increase audit quality in the short-run but could reduce audit quality in the long-run (Corollary 1 and Proposition 3). For another example, stricter auditing standards increase audit fees more in the long-run (Corollary 2). Yet another result is that the auditor and the …rm share the same preferences for auditing standards in the short run but diverge in the long-run (Corollary 3 and Proposition 5). As a result of these di¤erences, empirical tests of the economic consequences of auditing standards face a critical research design choice regarding the timing. On one hand, there is a premium for examining the consequences of new standards as soon as possible.
Moreover, the measurement of the short-run consequences is more accurate because it is less vulnerable to confounding e¤ects from other concurrent events. On the other hand, auditing standards'short-run consequences systematically favor stricter standards. It is important to account for this built-in bias when we interpret the empirical results on short-run data. The exact de…nition of the long-run vs. short-run is related to the length of time it takes for auditors to adjust their investment in expertise after a new standard.
In addition, these di¤erences also have policy implications. If a regulator such as the PCAOB cares about the standards'consequences in the short-run more than in the long-run, then the regulator has a bias towards excessively strict standards. The regulator's lack of long-term stake is a realistic feature of the regulatory system design (e.g., Kinney Jr (2005)).
Our model thus predicts that a myopic regulator has an inherent bias toward setting too tight standards.
Conclusion
The establishment of the PCAOB has profoundly changed the auditing profession. Yet the empirical evidence about the e¤ects of the PCAOB's auditing standard setting on audit quality is limited and di¢ cult to obtain. We have studied a model to understand the economic consequences of auditing standards. On one hand, auditing standards force the misaligned auditor to perform more audit. On the other hand, they restrict the auditor's exercise of professional judgement, lead to the compliance mentality, and reduce the auditor's acquisition of expertise in the …rst place. In other words, auditing standards compel auditors to do more work, but auditors end up becoming less competent. As a result of this trade-o¤, auditing standards reduce audit quality when the auditor's expertise acquisition is su¢ ciently sensitive to auditing standards.
The ultimate friction in our model is that auditing standards cannot replace auditors' professional judgement. This friction is perhaps common for any standard setters but is particularly relevant for the PCAOB due to its non-expert model discussed in the introduction.
The friction is akin to the incomplete contracting literature in which all contingencies cannot be ex ante speci…ed in a contract. Like in the incomplete contracting literature, including more contingencies to the auditing standards would improve e¢ ciency. For example, when the auditing standard can be conditioned on a noisy signal of audit risk~ ; which is likely to be the case in practice, the adverse e¤ect of such standards on audit quality will be mitigated.
However, to the extent that there is still residual information that the auditor observes about engagement but that cannot be incorporated into auditing standards, the trade-o¤ in our model still applies.
We have interpreted an auditor's expertise as her ability to assess audit risk. Audit expertise is of course a broad notion and can take other forms. The interaction between auditing standards and other forms of audit expertise may have di¤erent economic consequences than we have examined here. For example, audit expertise could also refer to the auditor's ability to do the same audit at a lower cost. In our model, it would be equivalent to assume that the audit cost C(a; e) is decreasing in audit expertise e: Consider the audit task of counting inventory. Counting inventory is costly but reduces audit failure risk. The optimal amount of inventory to be counted depends on an engagement's particular circumstances. We interpret audit expertise as an auditor's ability to assess the audit risk of inventory, while the alternative interpretation refers to an auditor's ability to count inventory more quickly. How auditing standards may a¤ect the auditor's incentive to acquire this type of audit expertise is left for future research.
We have focused on auditing standards related to conducting audits. Auditing standards are broader as they are also related to professional conduct, independence and quality control. In particular, auditing standards that govern entering the profession (examination and licensing laws) can be relevant for our thesis. For example, the auditing standards on continuing professional education could serve as a tool to regulate the auditor's choice of expertise e in our model and thus may mitigate the adverse consequences of stricter auditing standards.
However, to the extent that audit expertise e cannot be perfectly regulated, we face a problem similar to what we have studied in the model.
Appendix
We …rst establish the following Lemma for future results.
Lemma 2 The following holds:
2.
Proof. of Lemma 2: We have derived the audit choice in equation 6 in the main text, which is reproduced here: a (m ) = maxfC 0 1 (p m I); Qg:
For the misaligned auditor ( = 0), a 0 = Q. For the aligned auditor ( = 1), a 1 (m ) = Q if and only if C 1 (pm I) < Q. Since C 0 1 is strictly increasing, this reduces into m <m
pI . For m m, a 1 (m ) = C 0 1 (pm I). In other words, the auditing standards always bind for the misaligned auditor and bind for the aligned auditor when her assessment of audit risk is su¢ ciently low, i.e., m <m.
We …rst prove part 1 that 1 (m ) is convex in m . We look at the two cases of m <m and m m separately. When m <m,
Substituting it into 1 (m ) ; we have
The second-order derivative of 1 (m ) is given by
Collecting both 
The fourth equality is from applying the implicit function theorem (twice) on the …rst-order condition a 1 = C 0 1 (pm I). More speci…cally, by applying the implicit function theorem,
which gives
The sixth equality is from the …rst-order condition pm I = C 0 (a 1 ). The last inequality is from the assumption that for any a, C 000 0. Therefore, we have proved that m a 1 (m ) is linear in m when m <m and strictly convex in m when m m. Overall, m a 1 (m ) is convex in m : This proves the last part of the Lemma.
Proof. of Proposition 1: The equilibrium a (m ) and have already been derived in equation 6 and 9. We will explore the …rst-order condition 10 for the optimal choice of e extensively in the subsequent analysis, which is reproduced here:
The second-order condition is satis…ed by K 00 > 0. For ease of reference, we de…ne
is independent of fs; t; kg : As we have mentioned in the text, we now verify that > 0 and thus e > 0. From Lemma 2, 1 is convex in m . Since the posterior m i is a meanpreserving spread of
by the second-order stochastic dominance. This proves the Proposition.
Later it is more convenient to write out e explicitly as
Proof. of Proposition 2: We …rst examine how Q a¤ects the auditor's equilibrium audit level choice a (m ); which is derived in equation 6 in the main text and reproduced here:
For the misaligned auditor ( = 0), a 0 (m ) = Q and the auditing standards always bind for the misaligned auditor. Thus, @a 0 (m ) @Q = 1: For the aligned auditor ( = 1), a 1 (m ) = maxfC 0 1 (pm I); Qg: Because C 0 1 is strictly increasing,m
pI is the threshold for m above which C 0 1 (pm I) > Q (and below which C 0 1 (pm I) Q). In other words, the auditing standards bind for the aligned auditor if and only if her assessment of audit risk is su¢ ciently low. Therefore, when m <m; The e¤ect of Q on e is obtained by di¤erentiating equation 16:
The third step changes of the order of di¤erentiation and expectation. This is true by the Leibniz rule because For ease of reference, we de…ne Q @ @Q :
Q < 0 and is independent of fk; s; tg.
Proof. of Lemma 1: Di¤erentiating equation 17, we have:
The second equality uses de ds = t kK 00 ; which is obtained from di¤erentiating equation 16. The last equality utilizes the …rst-order condition for e (equation 10). Similarly, we can obtain
This proves Lemma 1.
Proof. of Proposition 3 and Corollary 1: The equilibrium audit quality is de…ned in equation 11 and reproduced here:
The total e¤ect of Q on A is given by:
Our proof proceeds in three steps. First, we show that the direct e¤ect is positive, i.e., Step 1: we show the direct e¤ect of Q on A is positive, i.e., @A @Q > 0. In particular,
> 0:
The …rst and second equalities write out the expectation. The third equality utilizes Proposition 2 and the law of iterated expectations. The last equality writes out the expectation with respect to :
Step 2: we show that @A @e = @A @e j e=e > 0: Writing out the expectations,
For ease of reference, we de…ne
We have proved in Part 3 of Lemma 2 that m a 1 (m ) is convex in m : Thus,
In combination with de dQ < 0 from Proposition 2, we have proved that the indirect e¤ect is negative, i.e., @A @e de dQ < 0:
Step 3: we show that the direct and indirect e¤ects could dominate one another and we specify the conditions for the dominance by using the intermediate value theorem. First, we write out 
Second, we show that
The third term is 0 because
The third equality follows from 
The …rst inequality is by the de…nition of probabilities that R 0 0 m i dF i (m i ) < 0 and
The second inequality is by the de…nition of K 00 max (and that Q < 0). Therefore, a suf…cient condition for dA dQ j Q= Q < 0 is
which can be rewritten as
Since both > 0 and Q < 0 are independent of fk; s; tg ; ( Q ) j Q= Q is negative and independent of fk; s; tg as well. Thus, the RHS of the inequality is strictly positive and independent of fk; s; tg : Therefore, if k is su¢ ciently small or t and/or s is su¢ ciently large, dA dQ j Q= Q < 0: Thus, we have proved that dA dQ j Q= Q < 0 under the conditions speci…ed in the Proposition.
Finally, collecting dA dQ j Q=0 > 0 and dA dQ j Q= Q < 0; there exists a Q A < Q such that dA dQ j Q=Q A = 0 by the intermediate value theorem. Since we have assumed that the secondorder condition d 2 A dQ 2 < 0, such a Q A is also unique. As we have discussed in the text, since we work with the general cost functions for audit and expertise acquisition and with the general distribution of audit risk ; the second-order effects of auditing standard Q on the equilibrium variables are often complex. Thus, we assume that the relevant second-order conditions with the general structure are satis…ed. However, a quadratic-uniform speci…cation is su¢ cient to guarantee the second-order conditions. In the quadratic-uniform speci…cation, we assume that C(a) = c 2 a 2 and kK(e) = k 2 e 2 where c and k are su¢ ciently large to ensure interior solutions. Moreover, we assume that~ is uniformly distributed over [0; 1] and that the expert auditor knows~ perfectly but the non-expert auditor knows nothing about~ ; i:e:, m i =~ and m u = 0 = 1 2 : With this speci…cation, a direct computation of
Proof. of Proposition 4 and Corollary 2: From equation 9 in the main text, the audit fee is given by
The second equality utilizes the de…nition of 1 (m ) de…ned in equation 7. The total e¤ect of Q on is given by:
First, we show the direct e¤ect of Q on is positive, i.e., @ @Q > 0. In particular,
The …rst term is positive because
The second term is positive because for any 2 fi; ug ;
The fourth equality is obtained from the proof of Part 2 of Lemma 2. The last step is by the de…nition ofm: Second, we derive the indirect e¤ect of Q on ,
de dQ < 0 follows from Proposition 2. We now prove that @ @e < 0. Writing out the expectations,
Therefore, 
Thus, the e¤ect of auditing standards on audit fee is stronger when the auditor can adjust her expertise acquisition than when she cannot.
Proof. of Proposition 5, Corollary 3 and Corollary 4: The auditor's equilibrium payo¤ and the …rm value (investors'payo¤) are de…ned in equation 13 and 14 and reproduced below:
We could also de…ne the joint payo¤s as
For Z 2 fU ; W ; V g; the total e¤ect of Q on Z is given by:
Our proof proceeds in three steps. First, we examine the direct e¤ect @Z @Q to prove Corollary 3. Second, we examine the indirect e¤ect. Third, we combine the direct and indirect e¤ect and use the intermediate value theorem to prove Proposition 5.
Step 1: we derive the direct e¤ect of Q on U , W and V . In particular,
Thus, the direct e¤ects of Q on U , W and V are all determined by the sign of
First, when Q > Q;
The …rst term
Second, we have
The last step relies on Q j Q=0 = 0; which is proved in equation 20. Finally, by the intermediate value theorem, for Z 2 fU; W; V g; there exists a uniquê Q Z < Q such that @ @Q E m ; [ (m )] = 0: The uniqueness is guaranteed by the second-order conditions. Therefore,Q U =Q V =Q W .
Step 2: we derive the indirect e¤ect of Q on U , W and V : The third equality utilizes the …rst-order condition on e , K 0 (e ) = ts k . Second,
= (1 t) s > 0:
Lastly, @V @e = @U @e + @W @e = (1 t) s > 0:
Step 3: we combine the direct and indirect e¤ect to prove Proposition 5. We start with We verify that these second-order conditions are indeed satis…ed in the quadratic-uniform speci…cation elaborated in the proof of Proposition 3.
Finally, we compare Q U , Q W and Q V :
The fourth equality uses dV dQ j Q=Q V = 0. The last inequality is due to Proof. of Corollary 5: We …rst consider the choice of the misaligned auditor. If the auditor follows the standard, she chooses a 0 = Q and bears the audit cost C (Q). If she chooses not to follow, she chooses not to audit (a 0 = 0), and bears the expected penalty f x. Therefore, there exists a x 0 at which a misaligned auditor is indi¤erent, i.e., f x 0 = C(Q). The threshold For an aligned auditor with m m, the auditing standard is not binding and she chooses a 1 (m ) = a 1 (m ) C 0 1 (pm I), regardless of x. If m <m, the auditor chooses a 1 (m ) = Q and earns 1 (Q) when following the standard. If she does not follow, she chooses a 1 (m ) = a 1 (m ) and earns 1 (a 1 (m )) f x. There exists a x 1 (m ) at which the aligned auditor is indi¤erent, i.e., f x 1 = 1 (a 1 (m )) 1 (Q). Since 1 (a 1 (m )) 1 (Q), x 1 0 and The inequality is due to a 1 (m ) < Q for m <m. For m m, a 1 (m ) = a 1 (m ) is independent of f . Thus The second-order derivative of The last inequality is due to C 000 0. Therefore, Proof. of Corollary 6: It is straightforward to see that the equilibrium audit choice a depends only on the audit value but is independent of the audit fee. As a result, both a and are the same as in our main model. We now show that the equilibrium expertise e also remains the same. To see this, notice that with observable at the time of audit fee negotiation, the audit fee depends on and we denote it by . The payo¤ to the auditor then becomes U = E m [C(a ) + pm (1 a ) I] kK(e):
As in the main model, the audit fee is set as such that the auditor's net surplus from the engagement is equal to t portion of the expected audit value E m [ (m )]. In other words, is determined by which is the same as in our main model. As a result, the equilibrium expertise choice e remains the same.
